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The suggestion of thematic and methodological affin-
ities between the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and 
the philosophies of Descartes and Kant appears repeated-
ly within the expansive secondary literature on the 
origin's of transcendental phenomenology, as well as in 
the actual publications of Husserl himself. Husserl's 
indebtedness to Cartesian thought reveals itself through-
out these writings, attaining its most explicit formula-
tion in a series of lectures given in 1929, published 
under the title of Cartesian Meditations. Within this 
work, Husserl refers to his own phenomenology as a type 
of neo-Cartesianism, pointing to Descartes' Meditationes 
as the impetus generating the movement from a developing 
phenomenology to a genuine transcendental philosophy. 
Descartes' conception of philosophy and science, as well 
as his insistence upon absolute certainty with respect 
to fundamental principles, strongly parallels Husserl*s 
own sense of the nature and task of philosophy. But 
despite the importance of such similarities, which do 
indeed animate the subsequent lines of advance within 
transcendental phenomenology, the bond between these two 
thinkers remains largely a spiritual one. The Husserlian 
divergance from the Cartesian enterprise occurs early 
along the path to phenomenology; a transition necessi-
tated " . . . precisely by (phenomenology's) radical devel-
opment of Cartesian motifs—to reject nearly all the well-
known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy."1 
So while it might be claimed that Cartesianism—with 
its view of philosophy as an all-inclusive science, upon 
the basis of, and within which, particular sciences can 
be grounded—and the attendant turn to subjectivity as 
source of apodicticity, affords the point of departure 
for Husserl's phenomenology, an even stronger affinity 
surfaces between Kant and Husserl within the concrete 
development of the idea of transcendental phenomenology 
itself. Both Kant and Husserl characterize their phil-
osophical positions as "transcendental idealism." The 
phenomenological reduction or epoche, which finds its 
initial meaning within the horizon of a Cartesian method-
ological doubt, can be interpreted in light of the sub-
sequent development of phenomenology as a kind of 
"critical" turn. With the introduction of the epoche in 
I 
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1907, Husserl was no longer immersed within a naive, pre-
critical problem set oriented exclusively in a positive 
manner toward beings, but saw the need for a radical 
critique of cognition which would uncover the conditions 
for the possibility of objectivity. In addition, there 
are extensive terminological parallels between Kant-
ianism and transcendental phenomenology. Notions such 
as the transcendental ego as active in world constitu-
tion, synthesis as the ground of objectivity, a develop-
ment of formal and transcendental logics, a doctrine of 
categories, and a pre-eminent concern with the a priori 
are just a few of the multiple points of apparent con-
version between the critical and phenomenological tran-
scendental philosophies. 
However, there are severe dangers in attempting to 
explicate and gain access to an understanding of Husserl's 
thought by clinging too closely to either the Cartesian 
or Kantian positions. These dangers may be more acute 
with respect to Kant, for the similarities in language 
may prove, upon closer inspection, to be no more than 
linguistic forms of agreement. Such equivocations could 
only serve to distort the genuine phenomenological sense 
of Husserl's transcendental philosophy, barring access 
to the entire problematic from the outset. With this in 
mind, we shall attempt an exposition of some of the cen-
tral concepts developed in the Cartesian Meditations, and 
then attempt a study of the sense of transcendental 
idealism as phenomenology in contrast to a critical tran-
scendental idealsim. 
The movement of thought within the Cartesian Medita-
tions reflects in a general fashion the fundamental 
structures which dominate all of Husserlian phenomenology. 
On the most universal level, it might be said that two 
concepts delineate the entire field and format of study: 
viz., the transcendental reduction and the problem of 
constitution. The transcendental reduction serves as the 
only avenue of approach to the realm of transcendental 
subjectivity, within which the transcendental ego is dis-
closed in its constituting activities as foundation of 
the world. Both of these dimensions of phenomenology 
must continually be kept in view, for the meaning of the 
epoche and the meaning of constitution are fundamentally 
inseparable. The concrete constitutional analyses dis-
close the richness of the epoche, firmly distinguishing 
it from a reversion to psychical immanence or a sub-
jectivizing of the sense of the objective world. Insofar 
as the Cartesian Meditations, like Ideas I, is intended 
to serve as an "introduction to phenomenology," the re-
flections are oriented along a developmental line, from 
the posing of the problem of philosophy as science, to 
the reduction as. methodological point of entry, to an 
83 
expository laying open of the field of transcendental 
experience, a laying open which elicits certain univer-
sal structures while probing to ever deepening levels of 
investigation. 
In the opening paragraphs of Cartesian Meditations, 
Husserl expends considerable labor in attempting to arrive 
at a guiding idea for philosophical reflection.; one which 
will give determinate direction to the somewhat amorphous 
sense of philosophy as "rigorous science." This guiding 
Idea is uncovered in the implicit telos governing all 
"de facto" sciences, as well as the original Cartesian 
enterprise itself. What serves as this ideal is a hier-
archy of cognitions, of mediate and immediate judgments, 
ultimately grounded in apodictic evidence, with a cor-
respondent apodicticity vis-arvis the primacy of these 
original cognitions. The possibility of realizing such 
a demand, however, is held in abeyance, bestowing upon 
the investigations a certain hypothetical tone analagous 
to that characterizing the Kantian "Copernican Revolu-
tion." But this hypothetical spirit is not one which 
infiltrates each level of inquiry considered in itself, 
but envelops the phenomenological enterprise with respect 
to its final aim, the aim that animated Descartes' own 
investigations: a reforming of philosophy into a science 
grounded upon an absolute foundation, a science which in 
turn grounds the multiplicity of positive sciences, 
whether they be material or formal, natural or social. 
The distinction is drawn between adequacy and 
apodicticity with respect to evidence. Adequacy im-
plies a certain wholistic orientation, an absolute ful-
filling of the unfulfilled, a harmonious synthesis which 
may lie at infinity, reminiscient of a Kantian Idea. 
Apodicticity, however, must serve as a measure at each 
step. Apodicticity is a further grounding of what is 
already evident, by going back and grounding at a higher 
level in principles. The issue is not one of grasping 
with certainty, nor even with full certainty which actual-
ly excludes doubt. On the contrary, apodictic evidence 
. . . discloses itself to a critical reflection 
as having the single peculiarity of being at the 
same time the absolute unimagineableness of . . . 
non-being, and thus excluding in advance every 
doubt as objectless, empty. 2 
It is this sense of apodicticity as criterion of rigorous 
philosophical science that forms the spiritual bond be-
tween Husserl and Descartes, and further, introduces the 
Cartesian methodological doubt and the turn to the ego 
cogito as functional within the Husserlian framework as 
well. But Husserl*a claim is that his own thought is 
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concretely differentiated from the Cartesian course in 
that the latter failed to understand the true signifi-
cance of the "I am," as a turn to transcendental sub-
jectivity. 
The demand for apodicticity functions in a twofold 
manner which in turn gives the transcendental epoche a 
dual nature, and correlatively bifurcates the Husserlian 
sense of the Absolute qua transcendental subjectivity. 
On the one hand, what are sought are evidences which are 
in themselves apodictic. The criterion of the absolute 
inconceiveability of the non-being of the objects of 
such experience is satisfied only by the immanent acts 
of consciousness itself. This is not to suggest that 
the being of the world is doubtful, but only that it is 
not apodictic; i.e., it is, in principle, dubitable. 
Not only do particular objects within the world at times 
show themselves as images, concretizing the possibility 
of non-being, but also entire experiential frameworks 
suffer the same devaluation, such as in dreams. There-
fore, the entire world, the one, objective, spatio-
temporal fact world, within which we dwell as men, 
labors under the shadow of the possibility of non-being. 
Not that it is rational to doubt the world, but that it 
is not fully rational to remain immersed within a naive, 
positive orientation. But the ego cogito, in the full 
sense of the multiplicity of possible acts of conscious-
ness, is indubitable on grounds of principle, is apodicti-
cally evident. 
Yet this constitutes only one of the dimensions to 
apodicticity as it appears in the Cartesian Meditations, 
and consequently only one of the senses of the epoche" 
and of the Absolute being of transcendental subjectivity. 
Apodictic insight must also be attained into the primacy 
of theBe original cognitions. The initial philosophical 
formulation is, 
I 
. . . the question whether it is possible for us 
to bring out evidences that, on the one hand, 
carry with them—as we now must say apodictically 
— t h e insight that as •first in themselves 1 they 
precede all other imagineable evidences, and on the 
other hand, can be seen to be themselves apodictic.3 
The latter demand is satisfied by the recognition of the 
indubitability of the cogitationes, of the lived exper-
iences themselves, regardless of the objective status of 
the transcendent claims inherent in such processes. But 
the former dimension of priority is grasped only with the 
realization that the entire sense of the being of the 
objective world is derived exclusively from such conscious 
life. Here the move is from the epistemological to the 
ontological insofar as the mode of being of the objective 
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world, its existential status, is shown to be relative 
and secondary to the Absolute being of transcendental 
subjectivity. It is from this aspect of apodicticity and 
of Absolute being that the concrete constitutive analyses 
of phenomenology blossom, for constitution, in general, 
refers to just such a relation between primary and 
secondary, absolute and relative being. 
The preceding brief treatment of the background of 
the reduction was intended solely to trace the correla-
tion between the methodological onset of phenomenology 
and the notions of philosophy, science, and apodicticity 
which animate the whole course of the Cartesian Medita-
tions . We can now attempt a presentation of the phenom-
enological reduction itself. One way of illuminating 
the significance of the epoche is by contrasting it with 
the Cartesian turn to the cogito. For Descartes, once 
the apodicticity of the "I am" was encountered, the 
problem immediately became that of reintroducing the 
transcendent world. The basic epistemological problem 
was, as it always has been, that of the relation between 
subjectivity and objectivity conceived in terms of im-
manence and transcendence. "The problem of traditional 
epistemology is that of transendence."4 How is it that 
that which is given with apodicticity, yet seemingly 
has only subjective significance, can relate to that which 
is beyond my "island of consciousness?" How is the "for 
us," even when given with clarity and distinctness, re-
lated to the "in itself?" It was precisely at this 
juncture that Descartes was forced to appeal to divine 
veracity as the epistemological guarantee of the objective 
significance of purely immanent conscious life. 
The phenomenological response to this difficulty is 
not a positive attempt to solve the problem. The intro-
duction of the methodological techniques characteristic 
of Husserl's thought is not oriented toward a radical re-
examination of the problem; rather the epoche dismisses 
this entire problem formulation as erroneous, as a 
Cartesian motif which must be transcended in the spirit 
of neo-Cartesianism. But this form of the problem could 
be considered as far more pervasive than merely a Cartesian 
dilemma, for it really serves as that framework within 
which the basic epistemological question need necessarily 
be posed, insofar as it is asked by natural men. Thus, 
Husserl claims, 
To the extent that I apprehend myself as a natural 
human being, I presuppose having apprehended a 
spatial reality; I have conceived of myself as 
being in space, in which I consequently have an 
outside of myself.5 
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The problem of transcendence which is raised by tradition-
al epistemology, Descartes' formulation serving as a 
paradigmatic instance, arises within a setting which 
presupposes as antecedant that which should be establish-
ed as a result of the critique of cognition. 
The phenomenological epoche, however, places the 
entire objective spatio-temporal world in brackets. The 
"spatiality" of space likewise is reduced, insofar as it 
serves as the horizon within which beings ia the world 
show themselves. It is just at this point that natural 
reflective consciousness must be radically differentiated 
from transcendental reflective consciousness. The turn 
to the act of cognition, the cogito as that which is given 
absolutely, can be undertaken within the context of two 
horizons. From a world-immanent perspective, the object 
of a reflective consciousness appears within the horizon 
of consciousness and object such that the cogito makes 
up a part of the totality of the world. Reality is the 
conjunction of matter and spirit, one extended, the other 
not extended. The problem then is to discover a lawful 
relationship between the two parts. The bracketing of 
the world developed by the reduction, however, develops 
along completely different lines. The epoche reduces not 
only individual objects within the world to their appear-
ing as such in consciousness, but also the "worldly" 
character of the world, as universal horizon within 
which such phenomena give themselves. It is this move 
that uncovers Absolute subjectivity as the universe of 
possible meanings, bearing within itself both the im-
manence and the transcendence of the natural world view. 
Thus being-in-itself and being-for-us are moments within 
the whole of transcendental subjectivity. The reduction 
is not, and could not, be carried out by running through 
the multiplicity of acts of cognition and reducing each 
in turn, but is realized by a single stroke in which the 
entire world, including conscious activity and the horizon 
within which this activity gains determinate significance, 
comes to be seen as "universal acceptance phenomenon," 
as the meant as such. Insofar as to be human is to exist . 
within a constant belief-in-the-worId, transcendental 
phenomenology makes a demand upon the philosopher which 
stands outside of his human possibilities. With this in 
mind, one can understand Ricoeur's description of the 
epoche as a spiritual discipline rather than simply a 
methodological device. 
The domain of phenomenological inquiry opened by 
the reduction is a realm of transcendental experience, 
characterized by its epistemological apodicticity and 
ontological priority. Husserl insists that the transcen-
dental is a realm of genuine being, of individual being, 
with a mode of existence proper to it. This mode of being, 
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however, is a unique and singular one, as is the ex-
perience which lays hold of it, the transcendental ex-
perience. While it is characteristic of worldly, tran-
scendent objects to give themselves only persectively, 
in an ongoing process of synthesis which is essentially 
open-ended, those objects of transcendental reflection 
(lived experiences) do not present themselves perspective-
ly. The ever present possibility of non-being which 
belongs to worldly objects is excluded essentially from 
lived experiences taken eidetically. The distinction 
between perspective variation, which is an experience, 
and perspected variable, which is spatial, is an absolute 
one. Thus, Husserl claims in Ideas I_ that. 
Between the meanings of consciousness and reality 
yawns a veritable abyss. Here a Being which man-
ifests itself perspectively, never giving itself 
absolutely, merely contingent and relative; there 
a necessary and absolute Being, fundamentally in-
capable of being given through appearance and 
perspective patterns.6 
Here, therefore, is the inversion of the meaning of Being 
at the core of Husserl*s transcendental idealism. 
The scientifically oriented necessity for apodicti-
city has led back to the ego cogito. The genuine sense 
of the epoche, as we have seen, is not grasped so long 
as it is understood in terms of psychological immanence 
and transcendence. But the radical philosophical meaning 
of this phenomenological "discipline" can be understood 
concretely only to the extent that the unique nature of 
transcendental being is uncovered. The movement in 
Meditations II-IV is precisely a laying open of the field 
of transcendental experience in its universal structures. 
Hence, it is not simply the bare ego cogito which is given 
with apodicticity. And correlatively, the phenomenologi-
cal onset is not that of the relation between the "I 
think" and transcendent objectivities; a problematic 
which led Descartes to the proofs of God's existence and 
veracity, and ultimately yielded what Husserl labels an 
"absurd transcendental realism." Transcendental phenomenol-
ogy undertakes the task of the exploration and systematic 
description of the realm of transcendental subjectivity. 
And furthermore, insofar as this is to be a new science, 
a study of the universal, the phenomenological and 
eidetic reductions are both necessary methodological 
moments. Husserl insists that, 
The bare identity of the 'I am' is not the only 
thing given as indubitable in transcendental self-
experience. Rather there extends through all the 
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particular data of actual and possible self-
experience . . . a universal, apodictically ex-
perienceable structure of the Ego.7 
Universal transcendental structures constitute the sub-
ject matter for phenomenology as science, and with the 
elucidation of these structures the sense, origin, and 
meaning of the transcendent world are uncovered. On 
this most general of levels, certain parallels can be 
seen between the Kantian and Husserlian problematics. 
It is transcendental ideality which furnishes the con-
ditions for the possibility of objectivity. No longer 
does philosophy remain locked within a positive orienta-
tion toward objectivities in which the self is "forgot-
ten," but rather subjectivity itself is submitted to 
critical reflection in a search for a ground of the world. 
Despite radical divergences between critical and tran-
scendental idealism, both recognize the necessity for 
probing the constitutive activity of consciousness in 
attempting to come to an understanding of the human 
world and its very possibility. 
******** 
In the development of thought up to the fifth medi-
tation, three eidetic structures of transcendental sub-
jectivity emerge as central to all phenomenological 
considerations. The first is that of the ego-cogito-
cogitatum, which reflects the general form of intention-
all ty. This singularity is not exhausted with the way 
in which conscious acts give themselves to reflection, 
but is further refracted in the, "ontic" predicates which 
are discovered as applicable. Whether that act be per-
ceiving, valuing, willing, desiring, imagining, remem-
bering, or caring, it is an achieving act of an ego 
towards an objectivity in the broadest possible sense. 
Thus the structure ego-cognito-cogitatum is an ordering 
of all conscious life, discovered by eidetic'intuition 
carried out within the limits of the epoche. One need 
not run through all types of conscious activities in 
order to recognize this structure as universal, but 
rather via imaginative variation one comes to intuit, to 
see in an apodictic fashion which excludes all possible 
doubt in advance, that a conscious act without such a 
structure would not be a conscious act. 
It should be further noted that this intentional 
structure is a relational structure, but one of a unique 
kind. The relational structure cannot be captured in 
spatial "metaphors," viewing the terms to be related in 
an ontic fashion as essentially independent parts which 
are capable of being thought in relation to one another. 
The unity of the.ego-cogito-cogitatum is not an external-
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ly imposed one, holding between fundamentally self-in-
closed factors. Instead, the unity of act, of cogitatio, 
of think-ing, perceive-ing, with ego and with cogitatum, 
(that it is I-am-perceiving-a-house-perception), is an 
internally articulated unity of moments which stand in 
an essential structural inter-connectedness. As Husserl 
says concerning the object oriented dimension of the re-
lation, "Each cogito, each conscious process, . . . means 
something or other, and bears in itself, in this manner 
peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum."8 When 
the problem of the relation between the subject and the 
object is taken up in this transcendental fashion, and 
the temptation to impose a world-immanent conceptual 
framework upon consciousness is resisted, attending 
merely to what shows itself in itself within the limits 
in which it shows itself, then the ground of the natural 
attitude's subject-object dichotomy is discovered within 
a primal unity of intentionality. Husserl's adament 
opposition to construct!vistic philosophy which emerges 
most clearly here, as the imposition of a conceptual 
schema which takes the moments of the whole of conscious-
ness as parts of an all, is the prejudice which pre-
cludes the possibility of bridging such a dichotomy. 
Eidetic insight grasps the necessary structural inter-
connectedness in its universal form, and brings to 
intuitive giveness the essentially dependent nature of 
moments which can be only abstractly conceived as in-
dependent parts. 
A second eidetic structure of transcendental sub-
jectivity is temporality, or the continuous conscious-
ness, specifically with reference to the 1905 lecture 
series,9 three levels of objects and temporality must 
be distinguished. The first level is that of the things 
of experience in objective time. This level is a pre-
phenomenological, pre-reduction time, corresponding to 
our naive, naturalistic conception of time. Just as 
upon the universal level of the being of the world, the 
epoche effects an inversion of the meaning of being 
such that the sense of the world re-emerges within the 
phenomenological sphere as relative and constituted, 
objective time can be traced to its genetic origins via 
phenomenological methods. 
The second level to be distinguished is described 
as, "the constituting appearance-manifolds of various 
levels, the immanent units in pre-empirical time." At 
this juncture, we encounter the immanent field of tran-
scendental experience. The immanent-objective sense of 
world time is contained in this level of temporality. 
But Husserl's analysis of time is not exhausted with 
this dyadic schema, nor is the genuine sense of time in 
Husserl*'s phenomenology thereby uncovered. Instead, 
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phenomenology probes to a still deeper level, to that 
which in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness 
is called, "the absolute time constituting stream of 
consciousness." While transcendent objects exist in 
objective time, and the immanent components of transcen-
dental consciousness have their being in immanent tempor-
ality, on the final level one discovers the "ultimate 
and absolute," viz., the consciousness of internal time 
itself, as that which makes possible transcendental ex-
perience. It is in these primal depths of transcendental 
subjectivity that phenomenological reflection reaches its 
very core. 
The differentiation drawn in the Phenomenology of 
Internal Time-Consciousness between the second and tnTrd 
levels, between "the constituting appearance manifolds 
in pre-empirical time" and "the absolute, time-constitut-
ing stream of consciousness," is also mentioned in the 
Cartesian Meditations. In this later work, Husserl 
formulates the problem in the following terms: 
The distinction between internal time itself and 
the consciousness of internal time can be express-
ed also as that between the subjective process in 
internal time, or the temporal form of this pro-
cess, and the modes of its temporal appearance, 
as the corresponding multiplicities.10 
If we take as an example an inherently temporal object, 
one that is what it is only insofar as it is.temporally 
extended (e.g., a musical tone), perhaps these distinc-
tions can be brought into clearer relief. Once the 
transition is made beyond the objective, worldly tone, 
with its spatial point of origin and its occurrence 
within objective clock time, we discover the lived ex-
perience of the tone itself. This lived experience has 
its own temporal form. Using the terminology of Ideas 
I_, the genuinely immanent components qf the lived ex-
perience, the noeses and the hyletic data, possess a 
temporal form. The immanent object as unity, the tone 
as lived experience captured in a reflective glance, 
and philosophically significant as transcendental ex-
perience, has a multiplicity of phases against the back-
ground of a temporal continuum. Enveloping the now-
phase are the just-elapsed phases and the coming phases. 
The phases belong to internal time as the form of immanent 
objects. And beyond this, we find the consciousness of 
internal time. With this dimension, Husserl's inquiry 
probes beyond the concern with intentional!ty as a re-
lation between the transcendental and the transcendent, 
and brings to light the possibility of transcendental 
experience itself. The consciousness of immanent data, 
the consciousness of internal time, itself possess a 
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structure which grounds and makes possible transcendental, 
reflective experience, and thus in turn affords the con-
dition for the possibility of objective experience. 
The immanent object, the phenomenologically reduced 
lived experience, is found to be a cohesion of a mul-
tiplicity of temporal profiles, in contrast to a spatial 
continuum qua series of perspectives. To account for 
this unity, an even more radical reflective turn is 
effected, toward the noetic dimension of noeses and 
hyletic data themselves, insofar as they are objects of 
reflection. Here a phenomenology of phenomenology takes 
place, as a kind of quid juris in relation to the pos-
sibility of the entire phenomenological method. It is 
Husserl's position that, "The fundamental form of univer-
sal synthesis, the form that makes all other syntheses 
of consciousness possible, is the all-embracing conscious-
ness of internal time."*! The primary level of conscious-
ness is identified with temporality, and the structure of 
this level is that of retention-primal impression-pro-
ten tion. The now moment is not simply an unextended 
point, and internal time consciousness is not merely a 
multiplicity of such points. Rather, the now moment 
emerges as extended, as a sort of species present, which 
contains within itself in an originary way retentional 
and protentional modifications. Memory, as a re-produc-
tive consciousness, and expectation, as an anticipative 
consciousness, are derivative modes in which the object 
is not given as originarily present, "in person." So 
Husserl states, in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-
Consciousness, with respect to retention, 
. . . if we call perception the act in which 
all 'origination' lies, which constitutes origi-
narily, then primary remembrance (retention) is 
perception. For only in primary remembrance do 
we see what is passed; only in it is the past 
constituted, i.e., not in a re-presentative way 
but in a primitive way.^-2 
The same holds for protention, or primary expectation, 
vis-a-vis the future. 
It can be said, therefore, that the second eidetic 
structure of transcendental subjectivity is temporality, 
which possesses the form of retention-primal impression-
protention. These are the fundamental "intentive com-
ponents of conscious life," as act phases which in them-
selves are not constituted. The first eidetic structure 
was expressed in the universal and necessary proposition, 
"all consciousness is intentional, possessing the ego-
cogito-cogitatum format." The second eidetic structure 
can be expressed as, "All consciousness is temporal, of 
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the form retention-primal impression-potention." Just 
as transcendent objects are found to be constituted in 
a multiplicity of appearances, immanent objects of tran-
scendental experience are a synthetic unity of a manifold 
of temporal phases which themselves have their intentive, 
noetic components in the partial intentions of retention-
primal impression-protention. Within a fully extended 
intentional act, such as hearing a tone, each partial 
intention is oriented toward the object, or rather toward 
one of its profiles; and simultaneously, the elapsed now 
points are retained such that I am conscious of inner 
duration. Here the critical dual relatedness of partial 
intentions is uncovered, a relatedness which makes self-
consciousness possible as unmediated due to the unique 
nature of inner temporality. 
The final dimension of Husserl's concept of transcen 
dental subjectivity that shall be developed prior to 
turning toward some general remarks on transcendental 
philosophy in Kant and Husserl, is synthesis. We have 
thus far uncovered two universal structures of transcen-
dental experience claimed to be given with apodicticity, 
viz., intentional!ty and temporality. Husserl also 
asserts, in the second Meditation, that, 
. . . the whole of conscious life is unified syn-
thetically. Conscious life is therefore an all-
embracing cogito, synthetically comprising all 
particular conscious processes that ever become 
prominent, and having its all-embracing cogitatum 
founded at different levels on the manifold par-
ticular cogitata,-" 
An understanding of Husserl's conception of synthesis is 
absolutely necessary for a positive appropriation of the 
inner dynamic of transcendental phenomenology; for inso-
far as phenomenology is a phenomenology of consciousness, 
viewed as absolute subjectivity, 'and synthesis is "the 
primal form belonging to consciousness," the movement of 
consciousness at all levels is a synthetic movement with 
respect to the constitution of both immanent and tran-
scendent objects. Such an insight, however, cannot be 
attained so long as one remains within an "ontic" frame-
work. Husserl sees synthesis as, ". . . a mode of com-
bination exclusively peculiar to consciousness,"14 and 
hence analogical schemes functional for wordly sciences 
are entirely inappropriate for the phenomenological con-
cept of synthesis. The unique mode of being of con-
sciousness, attested to by the possibility of the epoche, 
and further concretized by the discovery of intention-
ality and.the being-in of transcendencies which give us 
the "world," is also determinative for the concept of 
synthesis. 
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It is Husserl*s position that only in the elucidation 
of the "facts of synthetic structure" can the genuine 
significance of Brentano's concept of intentionality 
be revealed. The activity of synthesis, however, is a 
multi-leveled one, bifurcated along the most general 
lines into active and passive syntheses. It can be said, 
on a very broad basis, that for Husserl synthesis is not 
an externally directed activity which imposes determinate 
forms upon a pure manifold, thereby generating a unitary 
relatedness. Instead, synthesis is an internal articula-
tion such that any moment within the synthetic whole 
bears within itself, even if only in a potential, anti-
cipatory way, the synthetic whole of which it is a moment. 
This can, perhaps, be exhibited more concretely if we 
turn to a particular form of passive synthesis as found 
in a developed ego; one in which an environment of objects 
is already given as material for possible higher syn-
thetic acts. An intentional analysis of perception re-
veals a unitary object being meant or intended through a 
multiplicity of acts, in which the object as meant, the 
object of consciousness, shows itself in a variety of 
perspectival shadings. In any one act as cogitatio, only 
one feature or aspect of the object as meant shows itself. 
The chair that I now look to, which is given to me as an 
object for possible judgments, which could be submitted 
to analysis or put to some use via higher level active 
syntheses, at any moment shows only one feature. Another 
act, at another point in time and from another position 
in space, shows another feature, but another feature of 
the same identical chair. It is the synthetic unity of 
these acts which constitutes the one identical object as 
meant. 
But to claim that to each act there corresponds a 
particular and distinct cogitatum, and to pose the problem 
of the synthesis of this disparate multiplicity is to 
recognize only the dimension of actuality belonging to 
conscious life. It is to conceive of consciousness as a 
bundle of sense data, and then to attempt to impose a 
unity on this multiplicity analogous to the construction 
of a complex spatially extended entity from simple parts. 
The recognition that consciousness is not a res extensia 
is of minimal positive value if one still demands that 
specifically "ontic," world-immanent predicates and con-
ceptual frameworks be brought to bear on it. A descrip-
tive, transcendental, eidetic science such as Husserl's 
has the positive value that it is guided by the phenomena 
themselves, and does not immediately reduce the manifold 
senses of being to either the physical or psychical 
level. The unique mode of being belonging to pure con-
sciousness is separated by an abyss from the being of 
Nature, and synthetic consciousness as intentional being 
is radically differentiated from ontic combination. The 
peculiarity of intentionality, the theme developed in 
Section 20 of Cartesian Meditations, ought to be taken 
as a concrete instance which lends substantive meaning 
to the phenomenological slogan, "to the things themselves 
Such phrases remain empty and hollow unless they are 
rendered determinate through the working out of phenomeno 
logical analyses in light of the demands of the epoche 
and eidetic structures. 
Thus, concerning intentional analysis, Husserl 
claims that, " . . . its peculiar attainment (as inten-
tional) is an uncovering of the potentialities "implicit" 
in actualities of consciousness."^^ The distinction be-
tween actuality and potentiality is fundamental in phe-
nomenology, in that it supplies the basis for the central 
concept of "horizons," and simultaneously affords access 
to an understanding of synthesis as a mode of combination 
peculiar to consciousness. Each cogito is a meaning of 
something meant, and something more. This "something 
more" is contained in the cogito insofar as the latter 
is a constitutive moment of a synthetic whole. In per-
ceiving the chair I have explicitly before my gaze only 
one aspect, yet I simultaneously mean the chair in its 
fullness. The multiplicity of other possible views is 
contained within the singular act, and is co-intended 
in the sense of the cogitatum. Intentional analysis un-
covers and explicates this implicit dimension which 
makes up the horizon structure characteristic of all 
intentionality. The relation is an internal one between 
possibility and actuality. It is with this distinctive 
feature of the kind of being belonging to transcendental 
subjectivity in mind that we must understand Husserl*s 
notion of the unity of synthesis as, 
. . . not merely a continuous connectedness of 
coqitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one 
another externally), but a connectedness that 
makes the unity of one consciousness, in which 
the unity of an intentional objectivity, as 
'the same' objectivity belonging to multiple 
modes of appearance, becomes constituted.16 
******** 
This completes our treatment of some of the general 
structures of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. 
This interpretation was intended to develop certain 
themes in such a way that the contrasts could subsequent-
ly be drawn between the meaning of philosophy as critical 
transcendental idealism versus a phenomenological tran-
scendental idealism. Our comparative reflections shall 
begin with what I take to be a Husserlian criticism of 
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the entire structure of the Kantian problem set. From a 
Kantian or neo-Kantian position, the phenomenological 
method, with its attendant conception of philosophical 
knowing as intuition, might be termed dogmatic. Critical 
reflection presents philosophical knowing as a construc-
tive arguing to the conditions for 'the possibility of 
objectivity. From such a perspective, Husserl's phe-
nomenology might indeed seem both intuitionistic and 
ontologistic, insofar as (a) it fails to distinguish 
sensibility and understanding in an adequate fashion, 
and (b) reifies the a priori as object of intuitive re-
flection in opposition to a formal realm of meaning. On 
the other hand, from a phenomenological perspective, it 
can be said that the very sub-structure of Kantianism, 
the triadic schema of manifold-imaginative synthesiB-
unity of apperception, is a naive, pre-philosophical 
problem set. Beginning with this claim, we shall attempt 
to move systematically to a consideration of the meaning 
of "transcendental" for Kant and Husserl, to the resultant 
rejection of the thing-in-itself and the archetypus 
Intellectus, to a comparison of the ideas of synthesis, 
and finally to a look at the ground of unity in critical 
and phenomenological thought, as transcendental unity of 
apperception and temporality respectively. 
From the very outset of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
in the opening pages of the "TranscendentaT~Aesthetic," 
Kant presents the structural framework within which tran-
scendental philosophy as critical idealism shall unfold. 
There the stems of knowledge are delineated into sensi-
bility and understanding, a distinction which in turn is 
grounded upon the radical opposition between receptivity 
and spontaneity. Also introduced in this first section 
is a matter-form dichotomy, in terms of the manifold 
that stands in need of ordering, and the ordering activity 
respectively. 1 7 It is from within this framework that 
those structures which make possible experience emerge 
insofar as human cognition is finite: viz., (a) the 
pure manifold as given and which must be intuited under 
a certain form, (b) the forms of unity in light of which 
the transcendental power of imagination orders the mani-
fold, and (c) the unity of apperception, as the condi-
tion for the possibility of bringing the manifold to-
gether in one consciousness. 
For Husserl, however, this entire format reflects 
the inappropriate point of departure in Kantian thought. 
Transcendental philosophy is entirely subsequent to, and 
dependent upon, the phenomenological epoche. That which 
is known by critical transcendental knowledge is the pure 
forms of intuition and understanding to which any object 
must conform if it is to be an object of possible ex-
perience. The process of movement toward the realm of 
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the transcendental within Kantianism is an abstractive 
process. One argumentatively and constructively unpacks 
the concrete unity of any experience. 
In the transcendental aesthetic we shall, therefore, 
first isolate sensibility, by taking away from it 
everything which the understanding thinks through 
its concepts, so that nothing may be left save 
empirical intuition. Secondly, we shall also 
separate off from it everything which belongs to 
sensation, so that nothing may remain save pure 
intuition and the mere form of appearances . . . 
In opposition to this, the phenomenological epoche is not 
an abstraction in any sense, either critical or psycho-
logical. Rather, the Husserlian would claim that this 
method is concretion insofar as the limitedness of the 
sense of the world characteristic of the natural attitude 
is broken through by the reduction. 
To argue to a concept of pure manifold and absolute 
unity founded upon the distinction between receptivity 
and spontaneity is, for Husserl, to remain immersed with-
in a world-immanent outlook, and to have previously 
committed oneself to a view of the relationship between 
consciousness and object. Such notions are "construc-
tions;" abstractions derived from a sense of the world 
which is within the world, and nowhere are they given 
with the kind of apodicticity requisite for philosophy 
to be science. Receptivity and spontaneity, despite 
their apparent "obviousness," cannot serve as pre-given 
poles about which one can develop a genuine transcen-
dental philosophy, for such concepts are mundane. The 
reduction, in contrast, allows one to penetrate to the 
transcendental origins of these concepts themselves. 
The ego-cogito-cogitatum structure revealed within the 
domain of absolute subjectivity is a transcendental con-
cept which can be seen to be a necessary structure be-
longing to any conscious experience. It is this concept, 
as intentionality, which Husserl poses in opposition to 
a manifold-form-unity schema. 
In turn, one can say that for Kant "transcendental" 
is primarily an adjective, modifying knowledge. "The 
term •transcendental,'" claims Kant, ". . . signifies 
such knowledge as concerns the a priori possibility of 
knowledge, or its a priori employment. That which is 
known by this kind of knowledge, however, is the a priori 
world forms in their relation to the unit of appercep-
tion. The figurative synthesis is a unifying activity 
in which the form of givenness of the manifold is brought 
to the unity of one consciousness in a determinate 
fashion, i.e., according to the functions of judgment. 
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This synthesis, as pure, is to be contrasted with the 
reproductive synthesis belonging to the domain of psy-
chology. That which is known transcendentally is formal, 
the matter being given as raw manifold capable of being 
ordered by a priori forms. The transcendental for Husserl, 
in contrast, designates a genuine realm of being acces-
sible to a singular kind of experience. The transcen-
dental reduction is not an abstractive movement, but a 
bracketing of the world through which the world re-
emerges as intentional correlate of transcendental sub-
jectivity. The phenomenological transcendental domain 
is non-worldly insofar as that is understood from a 
naive or natural point of view. So while for Kant, 
"transcendental" might be said to point out a formal a 
priori, understood as ordering the matter which allows 
of being ordered, the phenomenological sense of "tran-
scendental" is that of a subjectivity which constitutes 
the meaning and being (Sinn und Sein) of the world. In 
phenomenology the opposition is between the transcendental 
as non-worldly and the transcendent as world-immanent, in 
contrast to the Kantian split between the world forms, 
which are a priori, and the world matter qua a posteriori. 
We can see, therefore, that accompanying the rejec-
tion of the opposition between receptivity and spontaneity 
as foundational concepts, is the dismissal of the matter-
form schema as it emerges in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
In turn the real differences between the senses of 
"transcendental" in Kantian idealism and Husserlian 
phenomenology appear. Another consequence of this orig-
inal break is the denial of the Kantian thing-in-itself 
and the archetypus intellectus, even as limiting con-
cepts within transcendental philosophy. Insofar as the 
theme of finitude is central to the Critique of Pure 
Reason, and finitude becomes manifest in terms of the 
receptivity functions as a limiting concept. The gap 
between phenomenon and noumenon on the side of the object 
is reflected in the differentiation between the archetypus 
intellectus and the finite human intellect on the side of 
the subject. For transcendental phenomenology, on the 
other hand, such distinctions are simply seen as con-
sequences of the original receptivity-spontaneity proble-
matic. Transcendental subjectivity, with its ego-cogito-
cogitatum structure, is the whole. The fact that tran-
scendent, spatial objects are given to consciousness 
only perspectively is not disclosive of an insufficiency 
or defect in our mode of knowing, but is representative 
of that kind of being which belongs to the region, Nature. 
The radical otherness of the Ding an sich which must be 
thought insofar as human knowledge -Ts sensible and finite 
is grounded in the receptivity of the manifold. Husserl's 
rejection of the former follows from his rejection of 
the latter, insofar as receptivity and manifold are 
constructs rooted in pre-transcendental world views. 
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It should be noted that Husserl 1s intention is not 
to dismiss the distinction between the in-itself and the 
for-us as an illusory one. Instead, his aim is to trace 
this distinction to its genetic origins in transcendental 
subjectivity. In this respect, a certain affinity can be 
seen between Fichte and Husserl. Fichte posits the radi-
cal distinction between dogmatism and idealism, with the 
attendant claim that we are all b o m dogmatists. That 
we do, experientially, think the thing-in-itself is 
given; but the content of this concept differs according 
to whether we think it transcendentally or transcendently. 
The latter position is called.for in life. "To think of 
something as a thing-in-itself, that is, as existing in-
dependently of myself, the empirical, I must think of 
myself from the point of view of life, where I am merely 
the empirical."2" Naively, we think a receptivity, and 
consequently a thing-in-itself. But for neither Fichte 
nor Husserl can this function as a ground concept in 
transcendental philosophy. The necessity for thinking 
the Ding an sich must find its foundation in the intel-
lectual intuition of the Absolute I and the accompanying 
positing of the I and non-I. For Husserl, the differenti-
ation between being-for-us and being-in-itself must also 
find its ground in transcendental subjectivity. It is 
here that the sense of the in-itself emerges as a kind 
of Kantian Idea. The being of Nature is such that it 
shows itself only through perspectives. It is through 
the patterned synthesis of a multiplicity of acts that 
the object as unity is constituted. This process of 
synthesis is an open ended one, in that, ". . . a mar-
gin of determineable indeterminacy always remains over." 2! 
Thus the being of a "Thing" takes on a nature analogous 
to that of a Kantian Idea in that the synthesis can 
ideally continue ad infinitum. 
Up to this point, an attempt has been made to dis-
tinguish critical transcendental idealism from phenomeno-
logical transcendental idealism in light of Husserl's 
rejection of the initial problem setting within which 
Kantian thought develops. In this vein, there is another 
aspect of Kantianism which should be clearly separated 
from the phenomenological movement, viz., synthesis. As 
has been said previously, both Kant and Husserl develop 
philosophies of subjectivity within which the object of 
consciousness is the result of the synthetic activity of 
the self. It could be claimed that the intention of both 
of these thinkers is to give an account of objectivity 
via an analysis of the life of consciousness, with this 
life being essentially a synthetic life. Husserl's con-
ception of synthesis has been discussed previously as 
one of the eidetic structures of transcendental sub-
jectivity. If, however, we look to Kant's notion of 
synthesis, attending primarily to the way in which it 
is presented in the B deduction, it becomes recognizeable 
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that the critical conception of synthesis differs radical-
ly from the phenomenological. Furthermore, this dis-
tinction too can be traced back to the starting points 
of their respective systems. 
For Kant, synthesis is always externally imposed. 
That which is to be combined is a manifold given via 
sensibility. That manifold may be pure or empirical; in 
either case, the ordering activity is imposed from with-
out. 
. . . All combination—be we conscious of it or 
not, be it a combination of the manifold in 
intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of 
various concepts—is an act of the understanding. 
To this act, the general title 'synthesis' may 
be assigned.22 
The previous account of Husserlian synthesis was limited 
to that of the passive, pre-predicative variety, such as 
that found in perception by a developed ego. Correspond-
ingly, a treatment of the Kantian account of synthesis 
between concepts in judgment shall be omitted, focusing 
instead upon the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, 
and primarily upon the pure manifold. 
All synthesis, as combination, is activity. This 
places synthesis on the side of the understanding as 
faculty of spontaneity. But synthesis, as a determinate 
mode of combination, takes place in light of a directive 
unity according to which that which lacks order acquires 
it. Insofar as the manifold is to be given to us, it 
must submit to the forms of space and time. Insofar as 
it is to be thought, however, it must be capable of being 
brought to the unity of one consciousness. All possible 
presentations must be capable of being mine. The differ-
ent determinate ways in which the manifold is to be 
brought to this unity are found in the functions of 
judgment. The application of the pure notions to the 
pure form of time, which contains any manifold given to 
finite, human consciousness, results in the categories 
as ontological predicates in the sense of a priori deter-
minations of the objectivity of objects. The extent to 
which the matter-form schema permeates this account of 
synthesis is evident. The matter is the given manifold 
to be combined by an act of the understanding, that act 
being the logical function of judgment. The externality 
of this idea of synthesis is due to the rigorous bifur-
cation of the stems of knowledge. With respect to the 
categories, Kant claims, 
. . . they are merely rules for an understanding 
whose whole power consists in thought, consists, 
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that is, in the act whereby it brings the syn-
thesis of a manifold, given to it from elsewhere 
in intuition, to the unity of apperception—a 
faculty, therefore, which by itself knows nothing 
whatsoever, but merely combines and arranges the 
material of knowledge.23 
This kind of synthetic activity is antithetical to 
that found in transcendental phenomenology. In Kant's 
imaginative synthesis, the matter to be ordered is 
either a pure or empirical manifold. From a phenomeno-
logical viewpoint, such a manifold is an abstraction 
rooted in a pre-philosophical starting point. On the 
empirical level this would seemingly be a bundle, or 
rather a chaos, of sense data. Despite the advance 
made by the Kantian onset over a Humean empirical con-
ception of consciousness, strains of such atomism still 
structure the critical problematic. Husserlian synthesis, 
on the other hand, unfolds within the framework of in-
tentional analysis. The parts to be combined are not 
atomic elements, but moments of a whole which bear with-
in themselves, in the unique sense of being-in which 
intentionality has uncovered, possibilities into which 
they may flow in actuality to constitute the synthetic 
whole. The Kantian emphasis upon the activity of con-
sciousness in the bestowal of objectivity is surely 
correct from a Husserlian perspective, yet this con-
ception of activity is not a genuinely transcendental 
one, for it emerges in terms which are applicable to 
the ontic. Despite the radical difference within criti-
cal philosophy between philosophical and natural (or 
empirical) knowing, the former still contains the seeds 
of the natural attitude due to its enigmatic starting 
point. 
If, finally, we look to the ground of all synthesis, 
of all unity, in the phenomenological and critical 
philosophies, the same type of opposition manifests it-
self. For Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception 
serves as epistemological guarantee of the objective 
unity of the object as well as of the identity of con-
sciousness throughout these presentations. This highest 
principle of unity is a pure form, a pure self-identical 
act which must necessarily be thought, but is in principle 
outside the domain of experience. In order for this high-
est principle to be transcendental, an abstraction must 
be made from the matter to the form, and insofar as it 
is to be on the side of the understanding, the abstrac-
tion is effected from the forms of givenness to form of 
spontaneity as universal self-consciousness. The partic-
ular synthetic activities which constitute the life of 
consciousness are possible only to the extent that the 
elements stand under the unity of one consciousness. 
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Husserl, on the other hand, claims, "The fundamental 
form of universal synthesis, the form that makes all other 
forms of synthesis possible, is the all-embracing con-
sciousness of internal time. "24 «phe problem of the 
highest principle of unity, of the condition for the 
possibility of any experience whatsoever, is not, for 
Husserl, that of the unity of a multiplicity of atomic 
parts which admit of being related to one another 
throughout the vehicle of the spontaneity of conscious-
ness. While transcendent objects manifest themselves 
through perspectival shadings oriented along the lines 
of spatiality, those immanent acts which constitute 
objectivity are themselves extended along a temporal 
continuum. And insofar as immanent acts are viewed 
from within the framework of the transcendental reduc-
tion, all consciousness, as synthetic unity, is subject 
to internal temporality. The absolute unity of con-
sciousness, therefore, is grounded in the structure of 
temporality itself. Each now moment, as a primitive 
intentional act, bears within itself in an internally 
articulated fashion, the past and the future in reten-
tion and pretention. Time is not simply a one dimension-
al flowing of a multiplicity of disparate nows, but is 
a primordially overlapping continuum whose elements are 
moments of an all-enveloping whole. Thus, Husserl 
states, " . . . any imagineable particular subjective 
process is only a prominence within a total consciousness 
always presupposed as unitary."25 This presupposition 
finds its warranted validity in the retention-primal 
impression-protention structure of the consciousness of 
internal time. 
It i3 at this level that Husserl hopes to have over-
come the enigmatic issue of the possibility of tran-
scendental knowledge itself. Time is no longer a form 
of intuition which serves as a mediating agent, as 
". . . some third thing which is homogeneous on the one 
hand with the category, and on the other hand with the 
appearance, and which thus makes the application of the 
former to the latter possible."26 For in this employ-
ment it is also that which stands between consciousness 
and the in-itself, barring knowledge of noumenal reality. 
Instead, in the lectures on internal time-consciousness, 
Husserl identifies the intent!ve components of a temporal-
ly extended conscious act with partial intentions, each 
of these bearing within itself a consciousness of past 
and future in an original fashion. This holding of the 
just-past founds the possibility of an unmediated re-
flective glance. "It is thanks to retention that con-
sciousness can be made an object." 2 7 And when this con-
sciousness is absolute consciousness, is transcendental 
consciousness as effected by the epoche, then it is re-
tention as a moment in the structure of the conscious-
ness of internal time which affords the possibility of 
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transcendental experience. Thus transcendental phenomen-
ology claims to do justice to the unique mode of being 
of consciousness/ striking out interpretive horizons 
which reduce the manifold senses of being to that which 
is physical, psychical, or a formal offshoot of such 
notions. And simultaneously, by exploring consciousness 
at the primary level of temporality itself, it claims to 
offer a kind of self-critique, a phenomenology of phenom-
enology, which deals directly with the problem of the 
possibility of transcendental knowledge. 
Pennsylvania State University 
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